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 THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING BIASED
 Anthony M. Dilloff
 PUNISHING HATE: BIAS CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW. By
 Frederick M. Lawrence. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1999.
 Pp. xi, 269. $39.95.
 The war against bias crimes is far from finished. In contrast, the
 battle over bias-crime laws is largely over. Bias-crime laws, as com-
 monly formulated, increase the penalties for crimes motivated by bias.
 The Supreme Court has held that such laws do not violate the First
 Amendment.1 Virtually every state has enacted some sort of bias-
 crime law.2 Even the federal government, which may consider itself
 without power to enact a general bias-crime law,3 has made bias a
 * Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan University School of Law. A.B. 1981,
 Harvard; J.D. 1985, LL.M. 1996, Columbia. - Ed.
 1. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 476 (1993). Some bias-crime laws may be
 open to challenge on other constitutional grounds. In State v. Apprendi, 731 A.2d 485 (N.J.),
 cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 525 (1999), the New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed a law that made
 bias a sentencing factor that would increase the maximum sentence to which a defendant is
 subject. According to the defendant, this law violated the Due Process Clause's guarantee
 that every sentence increasing fact be found by a jury under the reasonable doubt standard.
 The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected this contention based on its interpretation of
 Supreme Court precedent. See id. at 493-95. The United States Supreme Court will rule on
 the constitutionality of the New Jersey law this year. The constitutionality of the New Jersey
 law is far from certain. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 251-52 (1999) (finding it
 unsettled whether all sentence-range maximizing facts must be proven beyond a reasonable
 doubt). Even if the New Jersey law is struck down, however, states will be free to enforce
 bias-crime laws in which the existence of bias is not treated as a sentencing factor, but as an
 offense element to be proven at trial. Apprendi thus concerns the manner in which states
 will be required to establish the existence of bias, not the constitutionality of bias-based pen-
 alty enhancements generally.
 2. See The Staff of the Syracuse Journal of Legislation & Policy, Crimes Motivated by
 Hatred: the Constitutionality and Impact of Hate Crime Legislation in the United States, 1
 SYRACUSE J. LEGIS. & POL'Y, 29, 37 (1995) (reporting that, as of 1995, bias-crime legislation
 of some sort had been enacted by 47 states) [hereinafter Staff].
 3. Congress is undoubtedly aware of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence restricting its
 power to criminalize conduct, see United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down
 an act making carrying a gun in a school zone a federal offense), and has been informed that
 its power to enact general bias-crime legislation is doubtful. See The Hate Crimes Prevention
 Act of 1998: Hearing on S.J. Res. 1529 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th
 Cong. 39-44 (1998) (testimony of Lawrence Alexander, Professor of Law, University of San
 Diego) (urging that Congress lacks authority under the Commerce Clause and the
 Thirteenth Amendment's Enforcement Clause to enact a general bias-crime law).
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 sentence-aggravating factor for the range of federal criminal offenses.4
 Bias-crime laws thus are an established feature of the legal landscape.
 Against this background, Frederick Lawrence5 has written
 Punishing Hate: Bias Crimes Under American Law. Punishing Hate is
 not a work of radical vision. It blazes no new trails in its method or its
 conclusions. Rather, it is a careful reconstruction of reasons and ar-
 guments underlying the current consensus approval of bias-crime laws.
 Accepting that bias should matter for the criminal law, it implies a bet-
 ter theory is needed of why bias should matter, and seeks to provide
 that theory.
 To explain the importance of being biased, Lawrence analyzes
 bias-crime laws within the context of traditional moral theories and or-
 thodox First Amendment concerns. He cogently explains the basic
 form and function of bias-crime laws, offers some useful refinements
 for their formulation, vigorously defends their moral soundness and
 constitutionality, and forcefully advocates their adoption by the fed-
 eral government. Throughout, Lawrence displays an unwavering
 commitment to the ideal of equality, never leaving his readers in
 doubt as to where his sympathies lie. Occasionally voyaging into so-
 phisticated areas of moral philosophy, criminal theory and federal ju-
 risprudence, Lawrence presents his subjects with accessible, deliber-
 ate, and sometimes stirring prose. Punishing Hate also includes a
 number of extensive and well-researched appendices making the book
 a useful scholarly tool. Thus, Lawrence has written what may come to
 be regarded a classic liberal treatment of bias crimes and the laws gov-
 erning them.
 To say that Lawrence has presented a classic liberal treatment of
 his topic, however, is not to say that his valorizing of bias-crime laws
 will persuade the as-yet unconverted. Encompassing a variety of in-
 dependent ideals, liberalism6 occasionally yields merely plausible an-
 swers to difficult social issues. As will be discussed, Lawrence in
 Punishing Hate often seems to give unjustified priority to the ideal of
 equality. When the moral issues concerning desert become controver-
 sial, when the empirical evidence concerning social impact becomes
 thin, when the proper formulation of a law becomes debatable, when
 4. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ? 3Al.l(a) (1998-99). Section 3Al.l(a)
 provides:
 If the finder of fact at trial... determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant in-
 tentionally selected any victim or any property as the object of the offense of conviction be-
 cause of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, dis-
 ability, or sexual orientation of any person, increase by 3 levels.
 5. Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
 6. By "liberalism," I refer to a range of positions distinguished by their commitment to
 the rule of law, political and intellectual freedom, toleration, opposition to racial and sexual
 discrimination, and respect for the rights of individuals. See Jeremy Waldron, Liberalism, in
 5 ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 598 (Edward Craig ed., 1998).
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 the commands of the Constitution become unclear, when the meaning
 expressed by an official act becomes ambiguous, Lawrence is willing to
 let the rhetorical appeal of equality carry the day. Thus, while
 Lawrence does not settle for simplistic answers to the questions he
 asks, he often does not ask the hardest questions.
 Intellectually, bias crimes are located at the intersection of sociol-
 ogy, moral philosophy, criminal justice, American history, clinical psy-
 chology, and cultural studies. Punishing Hate thus attempts to cover
 an enormously complex topic in relatively few pages. Lawrence's
 strategy is to concentrate on the issues of greatest concern to his in-
 tended audience: the interested layperson, the lawyer, and the legisla-
 tor. In this Review, I shall strategically limit myself to discussing the
 three major issues of concern to Lawrence: the justification of bias-
 crime laws, the constitutionality of bias-crime laws, and the role of the
 federal government in prosecuting bias-crimes.
 I. THE JUSTIFICATION OF BIAS-CRIME LAWS
 In Chapter Three, Lawrence examines the central normative ques-
 tion: Are the increased penalties provided by bias-crime laws morally
 justified? Lawrence answers this question by applying both traditional
 consequentialist/utilitarian and deontological/retributive theories of
 punishment to bias-crime laws. Although such theories reflect deep
 philosophical differences, in practice they often converge. Both theo-
 ries recognize that, generally speaking, the greater the harm associated
 with a criminal act, the greater the appropriate penalty. Likewise,
 both theories recognize that the mental state of the perpetrator is
 relevant in determining the magnitude of the penalty. There may, of
 course, be instances where consequentialist concerns for deterrence or
 incapacitation would authorize greater penalties than those recom-
 mended by desert-based forms of retributivism. Because such results
 are arguably unjust, Lawrence rejects a pure utilitarian theory of
 punishment in favor of a mixed theory, i.e., a utilitarian theory of
 punishment with desert-based side-constraints (p. 50). He then ex-
 amines bias crimes in light of the mental states and harms associated
 with them. As discussed below, he concludes that both pure retribu-
 tive and mixed theories of punishment support bias-crime laws.7
 7. Lawrence's conclusion in Chapter Three that bias-crime laws are warranted is am-
 biguous at best. Lawrence writes, "[Chapter 3] argues that bias crimes ought to receive
 punishment that is more severe than that imposed for parallel crimes." P. 45. To support
 this claim, Lawrence invokes both positive retributivist as well as mixed theories of punish-
 ment. Pp. 46, 50. These theories purport to recommend when a particular punishment
 ought to be imposed. Nevertheless, Lawrence later characterizes his discussion as merely
 establishing that enhanced penalties may be imposed, not that they ought to be imposed. P.
 161.
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 Lawrence begins with a deontological justification based on the
 bias criminal's mental state.8 According to Lawrence, this deontologi-
 cal justification is the one espoused by "most supporters" of bias-
 crime laws (p. 61). This justification asserts that bias criminals are
 more deserving of punishment than other criminals without appealing
 to the independent contingent premise that bias crimes cause greater
 harm than similar crimes not motivated by bias ("parallel crimes").
 The justification begins with the unassailable premise that those who
 kill intentionally are more blameworthy, and hence more deserving of
 punishment, than those who kill negligently (p. 60). Likewise, so goes
 the argument, bias criminals are more blameworthy than other crimi-
 nals. Why should bias criminals be especially blameworthy by virtue
 of their motivation? Lawrence explains that "[t]he motivation of the
 bias-crime offender violates the equality principle, one of the most
 deeply held tenets in our legal system and our culture" (p. 61).
 It is unclear to what extent Lawrence endorses this most widely es-
 poused justification of bias crimes. Lawrence states the justification
 with implicit approval. Elsewhere in the book, he expresses similar
 sentiments (pp. 38-39, 75). In explaining the grounds for bias-crime
 laws, however, Lawrence often refers to only justifications based on
 increased harms associated with bias crime (pp. 4, 5, 40, 45, 80, 95,
 175).
 Lawrence is sensible to de-emphasize this deontological justifica-
 tion of enhanced penalties. It is flawed. From a deontological per-
 spective, mental states generally are considered relevant to blamewor-
 thiness because they speak to the responsibility of the offender for her
 wrongful act.9 Purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence are
 the four organizing mental states of the Model Penal Code.10 They
 8. I pass over Lawrence's discussion of the consequentialist significance of the bias
 criminal's mental state. Rather than looking at traditional consequentialist issues such as the
 bias criminal's susceptibility to general deterrence or need for incapacitation, Lawrence ar-
 gues that bias motivation is associated with more brutal crimes. P. 60. The argument, thus,
 relies on the harmfulness of bias crimes relative to other crimes, a topic Lawrence treats
 (and I discuss) in greater detail later.
 Lawrence advances an additional consequentialist argument based on mental states.
 According to Lawrence, just as intentional vehicular homicide should be punished more
 than negligent vehicular homicide because negligent driving has some positive social value
 (where no accident occurs), so bias crimes should be punished more than other intentional
 crimes. P. 60. This is unconvincing. Unlike negligent conduct, the conduct involved in in-
 tentional crimes, whether motivated by bias or not, generally has no positive social value.
 Thus, no distinction should be made between bias and other intentional crimes. Lawrence's
 argument needs much greater elaboration.
 9. See generally Michael S. Moore, Prima Facie Moral Culpability, 76 B.U. L. REV. 319,
 319-25 (1996) (explicating relevance of mental states to culpability).
 10. See MODEL PENAL CODE ? 2.02(2) (1962). The Model Penal Code does not explic-
 itly define "negligently" as a mental state. See MODEL PENAL CODE ? 2.02(2)(d). Never-
 theless, a mental state is supposed. In order to be negligent with respect to a material ele-
 ment, a person must be aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to be aware of a
 substantial risk that a material element exists.
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 serve to establish the precise degree of responsibility the wrongdoer
 bears for the harm she has caused. An actor who rationally, inten-
 tionally, and deliberately commits an assault based on racial bias is no
 more responsible for the assault than one who similarly commits an
 assault based on greed. They both are, we might say, maximally re-
 sponsible for the wrong of assault and so are equally blameworthy. Of
 course, the greed-driven offender merely knows the race of his victim
 and so is not as responsible for his victim's being of a particular race.
 A bias criminal is exactly a criminal who may be held fully account-
 able not only for causing harm, but also for the harm's being caused to
 a victim of a certain identifiable group. The group identity of the vic-
 tim, however, is irrelevant to the wrongfulness of the assault. African
 Americans, for example, have no greater right not to be assaulted than
 whites and, as a general matter, deserve no greater protection.1' A
 person who intentionally assaults an African American is not thereby
 responsible for a greater right violation than a person who commits an
 intentional assault indifferent to the race of his victim. Bias motiva-
 tion does not increase the perpetrator's responsibility for any morally
 relevant aspect of the assault.12
 On some accounts, however, mental states are relevant to blame-
 worthiness not because they imply greater responsibility for a harm,
 but because they reflect the flawed character that is the underlying
 cause of the crime.13 By rejecting the equality principle - "one of the
 most deeply held tenets in our legal system and our culture" (p. 61) -
 the bias criminal, it may be argued, reveals his character to be more
 deeply flawed than that of the ordinary criminal.l4
 Without taking a position on the general validity of character theo-
 ries of punishment, I do not believe that such theories provide support
 for bias-crime laws. The equality principle does not appear to possess
 the privileged position that Lawrence ascribes to it. Although
 11. Bias-crime laws protect all groups equally. A law that provided enhanced penalties
 for crimes against only those of a particular racial or religious group likely would offend
 principles of substantive equality. I do not know any advocates of such group-specific laws,
 and I do not understand Lawrence as supporting bias-crime laws on the ground that they are
 covert minority-protection laws.
 12. This point, like many others raised in this Review, is more fully developed in my ar-
 ticle on bias-crime laws. See Anthony M. Dillof, Punishing Bias: An Examination of the
 Theoretical Foundations of Bias Crime Statutes, 91 NW. L. REV. 1015 (1997).
 13. See, e.g., R.A. Duff, Choice, Character, and Criminal Liability, 12 L. & PHIL. 345, 362
 (1993) ("The proper focus of the criminal process is not, the 'character' theorist argues, on
 the particular actions for which a defendant is formally convicted and sentenced, but on
 some character-trait that his criminal act revealed."); Michael S. Moore, Choice, Character,
 and Excuse, SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y, Spring 1990, at 29, 31-40.
 14. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, The State's Interest in Retribution, 283 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
 ISSUES 283, 285 (1994) (characterizing bias-crime laws as punishing in response to a person's
 particularly great inner wickedness); see also Paul H. Robinson, Hate Crimes: Crimes of
 Motive, Character, or Group Terror?, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 605, 609 (considering,
 but rejecting, such a theory as inconsistent with traditional criminal law theory).
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 Lawrence does not explicitly define it, the equality principle roughly
 appears to be the principle that individuals should be treated without
 regard to race, color, religion, or other characteristics that historically
 have been the basis for widespread discrimination (pp. 11-20). So de-
 fined, this principle has ascended undoubtedly in importance in our
 culture and legal system in recent decades. Yet it is only one among
 many important ideals. Our culture and legal system equally cherish
 the principles of fairness, human dignity, autonomy, altruism, reci-
 procity, forgiveness, loyalty, and self-expression to name a few.
 Sadists, wife-beaters, loan sharks, child molesters, drug pushers, and
 their ilk generally act on motives as abhorrent as bias and generally
 have characters that are equally flawed. The standard penalty levels
 are believed sufficient to deliver the punishments they deserve. They
 should be sufficient for bias criminals as well.
 Lawrence's harm-based analysis is more convincing. In arguing
 that bias crimes cause greater harms than parallel crimes, Lawrence
 takes both an ex ante and an ex post perspective on bias crimes.15 Ex
 ante, Lawrence contends, a rational person would prefer to be the vic-
 tim of a parallel crime because of the deep psychological harm that
 bias crimes may inflict (pp. 61-62). Is this correct? Deep psychologi-
 cal harm can be caused by perceived attacks on one's identity or sense
 of self. Some people's identities are based primarily on their race and
 religious affiliations. Other people's however are based on their fam-
 ily, hobbies, profession, ties to their community, commitments to sport
 teams, their college, state, and so on. Most people in our pluralistic
 and polymorphous culture define themselves by reference to many in-
 dependent categories. I, for example, am a law professor, a Mets fan,
 a person of Ukrainian extraction, a cat owner, and an advocate of
 abortion rights. If, one day, I found the tires of my car slashed, I am
 not at all sure that, ex ante, I would prefer to learn that the perpetra-
 tor was a student appalled at my teaching ability, a law professor of-
 fended by my review of his book, a radical anti-abortion activist, or a
 crazed Yankees fan who wanted to strike out at my team. Each sce-
 nario carries its particular pain.
 Indeed, it is deeply disconcerting to be the target of "random"
 violence. I remember being mugged as a teenager one night by a
 group of older teens who, in retrospect, probably had nothing better to
 do that night. As their blows rained down, I recall being overcome by
 the sheer senselessness of why I, a completely anonymous person to
 them, would be the target of their aggression. An explanation of any
 type, even one that included the despicable proposition "they think
 Jews deserve it" might have been more satisfying than contending
 with the unanswerable existential question "Why me?" As Lawrence
 15. Lawrence does not discuss the relation of these perspectives. It is not clear whether
 he believes they are equivalent or, if they diverge, which should control.
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 recognizes, bias crimes are crimes based neither on relatively unique
 attributes of the individual (such as past personal relations with the
 perpetrator) nor extremely common characteristics (such as carrying a
 wallet) (pp. 9, 62). The characteristics on which bias crimes are based,
 for example race and religion, fall somewhere in between. Lawrence,
 however, does not explain why crimes based on such middle-level
 characteristics result in "unique humiliation" (p. 62). Although in one
 passage, Lawrence theorizes that minority victims of bias crimes expe-
 rience attacks as forms of racial stigmatization (p. 41), elsewhere he
 undercuts that theory by citing evidence that minority victims of bias
 crime do not experience greater psychological trauma than white bias-
 crime victims (p. 40).
 More persuasive is Lawrence's harm-analysis from an ex post per-
 spective. Here, Lawrence relies on newspaper accounts and sociologi-
 cal studies documenting the feeling of depression and anxiety among
 bias-crime victims (pp. 63, 224 n.66). These works, however, suffer
 from baseline questions. Bias-crime victims may suffer greater psy-
 chological harms, but compared to whom? As offenses vary greatly in
 circumstance and participants, there are likely many categories of vic-
 tims of a given offense who also suffer greater depression and anxiety
 than the average offense victim. Those assaulted on holidays, by alco-
 holics, by spouses, in prisons, in public, or the complementary sets of
 victims, may experience greater than average psychological harm. As
 Lawrence recognizes, the criminal law can operate only with a small
 number of levels of felonies and misdemeanors (p. 56). Thus, to jus-
 tify an enhanced range of punishments, bias crimes must form a rela-
 tively tight class of crimes resulting in special psychological damage.
 None of the research cited by Lawrence compares bias crimes with
 other potentially psychologically harmful subclasses of parallel crimes
 - such as assaults based on sadism, gang-violence, random victim se-
 lection, political affiliation, or intense personal animosity - all of
 which can be accommodated, it is thought, under the standard set of
 penalty levels.16
 There is a further, generally unnoticed, issue associated with
 Lawrence's claim that the greater psychological harm suffered by bias-
 16. Studies cited by Lawrence, such as Joan C. Weiss, Ethnoviolence: Impact upon and
 Response of Victims and the Community, in BIAS CRIME: AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT
 AND LEGAL RESPONSES 174, 182 (1993), only compare bias crime to the general category of
 "personal" crimes.
 There is a second baseline question. It is not clear that the degree of physical violence is
 held constant when the psychological impacts of bias and parallel crimes are compared. Bias
 crimes tend to be more violent than parallel crimes (p. 39). Their greater violence, rather
 than their victims' perceptions of bias motivation, could explain their greater psychological
 impact. Moreover, the statistically greater physical violence involved in bias crimes does not
 justify treating these crimes separately as a uniquely penalized class of offenses; the standard
 set of criminal laws and penalty ranges is thought already sufficient to accommodate the
 subclass of particularly violent instances of crime.
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 crime victims justifies the harsher punishment of bias criminals.
 Harm, as used in either consequentialist or retributive theories, is a
 concept with a normative component. Not every unwanted occur-
 rence constitutes a harm that justifies deterring the conduct that pro-
 duced the unwanted occurrence. Likewise, not every setback of inter-
 ests constitutes a harm that is relevant to determining the punishment
 an actor deserves.7 For example, if a man is greatly disturbed by the
 knowledge that his neighbor reads heretical literature on Sunday, this
 disturbance should not be recognized as a harm for purposes of pun-
 ishment. One way to reach this conclusion is to reason in a Rawlsian
 manner that self-interested individuals who value liberty would not
 agree in advance to restrictions on intellectual liberty based on the po-
 tentially unlimited sensitivity of second parties.'8 Another way to
 reach the conclusion is to rely on the basic moral premise that it is
 simply no business of one person what another reads - a person has a
 sphere of privacy and others have no claim to control what goes on
 within that sphere.'9 One's thoughts, to the extent they do not evi-
 dence future wrongdoing, are arguably within such a sphere.20 Our
 thoughts are paradigmatically private matters. They help define who
 we are and reflect only our subjective beliefs and values. It would be
 generally conceded that adhering to racism as an abstract principle or
 even engaging in generally lawful and innocuous activities because of
 one's racism, such as closing one's store to honor Hitler's birthday,
 should not be grounds for punishment even if the fact of one's racism
 or the racist reason for one's action may greatly disturb another.21 In-
 deed, the appreciation that such actions are another's, and hence not
 17. See JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 31-36 (1984) (distinguishing setbacks from
 harms and noting that a sense of harm carries normative implications).
 18. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE ch. III (1971).
 19. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (invalidating a state statute prohib-
 iting possession of obscene materials in the privacy of the home).
 20. The claim to dominion over one's own thoughts has Lockean roots. See JOHN
 LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government ? 27, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter
 Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967); see also Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Prop-
 erty, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 65, 78 (1997) ("If we have the rights to control anything, it is the
 contents of our minds."); III Lysander Spooner, The Law of Intellectual Property: or An Es-
 say on the Right of Authors and Inventors to a Perpetual Property in Their Ideas, in THE
 COLLECTED WORKS OF LYSANDER SPOONER 58 (Charles Shively ed., 1971) ("Nothing is,
 by its own essence and nature, more perfectly susceptible of exclusive appropriation, than a
 thought.").
 21. Concerning the feelings of outrage that one person's religious views might cause an-
 other, John Stuart Mill argued:
 [T]here is no parity between the feeling of a person for his own opinion, and the feeling of
 another who is offended at his holding it; no more than between the desire of a thief to take
 a purse, and the desire of the right owner to keep it. And a person's taste is as much his own
 peculiar concern as his opinion or his purse.
 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY WITH THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN AND CHAPTERS ON
 SOCIALISM 84 (Stefan Collini ed., 1989) (1859).
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 part of our individual identity, enables us to live with another's objec-
 tionable attitudes. Admittedly more controversial are cases where the
 attitudes give rise to actions, such as bias crimes, that wrongfully im-
 pinge on others. Perhaps here, the victim has some claim to being
 psychologically harmed by thoughts that generally are not cognizable
 grounds for complaint. But there is a respectable normative argument
 that only the conduct, or, at most, the intent to engage in the conduct,
 is the legitimate concern of the victim.22 This argument undoubtedly is
 bolstered by the proposition, advanced earlier,23 that motives relating
 to race or other morally neutral characteristics do not increase the ac-
 tor's responsibility for a given wrong or manifest a worse character. If
 a particular motive should not matter to a person determining the ac-
 tor's punishment, why should it matter to the person harmed? Fol-
 lowing this line of reasoning, the actor's motives, even if they generally
 are of concern to the victim, should not be. One's legitimate area of
 grievance ends where another's underlying thought processes begin.
 Any complete inquiry into the moral justification of bias-crime laws
 should address this issue.24
 A further short-coming of Lawrence's attempt to justify bias-crime
 laws is his failure to apply his theoretical justifications to either exist-
 ing bias-crime laws or his own model bias-crime law. It is fair to con-
 cede that bias crimes, generally speaking, create greater apprehension
 in the target community and produce greater trauma in society at large
 than crimes from other motivations. These effects, however, are dif-
 fuse. Compared to the other sorts of harms the criminal law seeks to
 prevent, these effects are difficult to identify and quantify. In contrast,
 the enhanced penalties authorized by bias-crime laws are concrete and
 specific. Such laws cannot be considered justified unless the amount
 of the additional penalty is justified. If the devil is in the details,
 Lawrence's failure to deal with these details bedevils his argument. A
 hypothetical bias-crime law that imposed a $20 fine in addition to the
 penalty for the underlying crime likely would meet little objection
 from those who believe that desert should place a ceiling on unjusti-
 fied punishment. A bias-crime law that imposed a mandatory addi-
 tional twenty-year penalty likely would be considered objectionable
 22. It may be that "even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being
 kicked." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 7 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
 Belknap Press 1963) (1881). It is another question whether the dog cares what inadequate
 reason motivated the kick.
 23. See supra text accompanying notes 9-15.
 24. In a later part of the book, Lawrence in fact distinguishes between an offense caused
 by racial motivation and apprehension of future physical harm that may be caused by a bias
 crime. He argues that, for the purpose of justifying bias-crime laws under the First Amend-
 ment, only the apprehension of future physical harm is relevant. P. 102. He does not, how-
 ever, elaborate on the grounds of the distinction, and it is not clear whether he thinks it re-
 flects a general moral principle as suggested above.
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 by even hard-core supporters of bias-crime laws. In fact, the penalty
 enhancements established by most bias-crime laws fall somewhere in
 between.25
 Lawrence concludes his book by offering a model bias-crime law
 that is supposed to embody his considered opinions concerning the na-
 ture, scope, and necessity of bias-crime laws (pp. 170-71). Lawrence's
 model law takes the not uncommon approach of providing for a pen-
 alty enhancement of one or two sentencing levels. Assuming a back-
 ground penal code like the Model Penal Code, Lawrence's model law
 would authorize the punishment of a bias-motivated act of criminal
 trespass resulting in a loss of under $25 at the level of an assault with a
 deadly weapon; a simple assault based on bias at the level of an aggra-
 vated assault manifesting extreme indifference to human life; and a
 bias assault with a deadly weapon as a murder.26 Even in qualitative
 terms, these are significant penalty enhancements. To my mind, the
 equivalences in desert they suggest are problematic.27 Lawrence ad-
 mits that his purpose is not to determine the precise amount of penalty
 enhancement appropriate for every possible bias offense (pp. 222-30).
 But unless he demonstrates that the appropriate penalty enhancement
 is great enough to, at least, move a bias crime into the next highest
 penalty level, he cannot claim to have presented a full defense of bias-
 crime laws.
 II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF BIAS-CRIME LAWS
 In Chapter Five, Lawrence asks "[a]re bias-crime laws constitu-
 tional" (p. 80)? The quick and easy answer, based on Wisconsin v.
 Mitchell,28 is "yes." In Mitchell, the Supreme Court squarely held that
 a Wisconsin statute establishing increased sentences for bias crimes
 did not violate the First Amendment.29 Lawrence, however, does not
 rest with the positive law orthodoxy of the current Court. Nor does he
 attempt to work through the thicket of First Amendment cases and
 25. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 480 (1993) (upholding a state bias-
 crime law that permitted a five-year sentencing enhancement).
 26. See MODEL PENAL CODE ?? 210.2, 211.1, 220.3 (1962).
 27. Cf Lawrence Crocker, Hate Crime Statutes: Just? Constitutional? Wise?, 1992/1993
 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 485, 495 ("[M]y own intuition.. .[is] that it is excessive for an assault
 that would otherwise receive a two-year sentence to receive instead a seven-year sen-
 tence ....").
 28. 508 U.S. 476 (1993).
 29. Bias-crime laws are open to challenge on grounds other than the First Amendment.
 Such challenges, however, are directed at only the procedures that implement bias-triggered
 penalty enhancements, and so only contingently involve bias-crime laws. See supra note 1.
 Lawrence reasonably limits his discussion of the constitutionality of bias-crime laws to their
 consistency with the First Amendment and their arguably novel focus on motive.
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 doctrine that the extensive literature on the topic engages.30 Rather,
 Lawrence seeks to explore whether bias-crime laws are consistent with
 the deep and well-established values and principles lying at the heart
 of the First Amendment.31 Lawrence does not give these values and
 principles short shrift. He portrays himself as a First Amendment
 stalwart in his view that racist speech should be protected (p. 82).
 Nevertheless, Lawrence ultimately concludes that bias-crime laws and
 the First Amendment are consistent and that it is possible "both to
 punish the bias criminal [pursuant to bias-crime laws] and to protect
 the right of the bigot to express his beliefs" (p. 80). Lawrence thus
 sets himself the project of distinguishing between bias crimes, which
 may be subject to enhanced penalties, and bias speech, which may not.
 This is a challenging project given that some speech may be criminal,
 some criminal conduct may be expressive, and both may be motivated
 by bias.
 A. Bias-Crime Laws and Free Speech
 Where does bias speech end and bias crime begin? To answer this
 question, Lawrence proposes a "reformation" (p. 99) of the "fighting
 words" doctrine. The fighting words doctrine, as it now exists, permits
 the banning of words that tend to incite an immediate breach of the
 peace.32 Lawrence points out, however, that the doctrine, as it was
 originally formulated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,33 permitted the
 banning of, not only words that tended to incite an immediate breach
 of the peace, but also those that by their very utterance inflicted in-
 jury. According to Lawrence, the Supreme Court, in choosing to em-
 30. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women's Heath Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 762-64 (1994) (holding that
 an injunction against anti-abortion protests was not improperly content based); Forsyth
 County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134 (1992) (stating that listeners' reaction to
 a speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S.
 560 (1991) (considering the First Amendment protections of nude dancing); Simon &
 Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105-23 (1991) (invali-
 dating content-based regulation on speech intended to benefit crime victims); Texas v.
 Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (invalidating a state restriction on burning the American flag);
 City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986) (discussing the signifi-
 cance of a legislative motive to suppress speech); California v. Cohen, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)
 (recognizing the constitutional right to wear a jacket bearing an offensive slogan about the
 draft).
 31. Lawrence identifies "the right to free expression" as lying at the heart of our legal
 culture. P. 80.
 32. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522 (1972) (defining fighting words as
 "those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
 the peace" (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942))). The scope of
 the fighting words doctrine as it currently exists, is discussed in Melody L. Hurdle, Recent
 Development, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul: The Continuing Confusion of the Fighting Words
 Doctrine, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1143, 1174 (1994) (suggesting that fighting words should be de-
 fined in terms of their minimal contribution to the marketplace of ideas).
 33. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
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 phasize the first type of fighting words and ignore the second, took the
 wrong path. Lawrence writes, "If Chaplinsky is to have any contem-
 porary vitality, it must be understood to place outside the First
 Amendment's reach those words that are intended to and have the
 likely effect of creating fear of injury in the addressee" (p. 102).
 Lawrence, however, is careful to distinguish the fear of injury and the
 mere wounding of feelings. "Words that have the intent to hurt the
 addressee's feelings, even those that also have that effect, however un-
 fortunate, do not come under this understanding of fighting words" (p.
 102). This distinction between words that portend harm and words
 that merely wound feelings, not that between "conduct" and "speech,"
 is the key to drawing the line between constitutionally proscribable
 bias crimes and constitutionally protected hate speech. Thus,
 Lawrence concludes, "Racially targeted actions that are intended to
 create fear in the addressee and that are likely to do so may be treated
 as bias crimes.... [R]acially targeted behavior that vents the actor's
 racism is racial speech that is protected, even if it disturbs the observer
 greatly" (p. 102).
 It is not clear that Lawrence needs to reformulate the Supreme
 Court's fighting words jurisprudence to get where he wants to go.
 Words used to communicate realistic threats of violence - "Your
 money or your life" - are uncontroversially subject to state control.
 There are no serious First Amendment challenges to the tort of assault
 or the crime of menacing even though words often are used in con-
 junction with other factors to perpetrate these unlawful acts. There
 are, however, three difficulties with drawing the distinction between
 proscribable conduct and protected speech along the lines Lawrence
 suggests.
 First, the distinction between racially targeted action that creates
 fear of injury and racially targeted conduct that vents the actor's ra-
 cism is unsound. Racially motivated conduct may simultaneously cre-
 ate fear and vent racism. The distinction thus is as problematic as the
 distinction between verbal acts ("speech") and nonverbal acts ("con-
 duct") that Lawrence rejects as inadequate to demarcate the
 protected/proscribable boundary (pp. 89-92). Furthermore, racially
 based conduct that may be proscribed (bias crimes) should not be
 identified with acts that create fear of injury in the addressee. Under
 most bias-crime laws,34 a white teenager who anonymously slashes the
 tires of an African-American person's car because of bias commits a
 bias crime even if he reasonably believes his act will be perceived as
 one of random vandalism, not bias. If the enhanced punishment of
 this act as a bias crime is constitutional, it cannot be because it in-
 volves the intent or effect of creating fear of injury in the addressee.
 34. See Apps. B-E (presenting representative bias-crime laws).
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 Second, Lawrence's identification of bias crimes with acts that are
 intended to and will have the likely effect of creating fear of injury
 does not extend sufficient protection to racially motivated expressive
 conduct. The march of Nazi sympathizers in Skokie, Illinois might be
 described as a "[r]acially targeted action[] that [is] intended to create
 fear in the addressee and [is] likely to do so" (p. 102). Likewise, in the
 1950s, the public advocacy of communism may have created in some
 the fear of being injured in the course of a violent uprising. Such acts,
 however, clearly are protected under the First Amendment.3 They
 critically differ from assault and menacing because these latter acts, by
 definition, require the creation of at least the fear of immediate in-
 jury.36 The First Amendment traditionally has required courts to con-
 sider the concreteness and temporal proximity of the threatened
 harms.37 Are the fears of future injury caused by bias crimes closer to
 the fears of immediate injury associated with assault and menacing or
 the speculative fears associated with neo-Nazism or a possible
 communist-inspired uprising? In the latter cases, the time frame, per-
 petrator, circumstances, and type of violence feared are indefinite and
 unspecified. Likewise, the fear of injury, or "heightened sense of vul-
 nerability" (p. 40), that bias crimes create are indeterminate in these
 respects. Just as the general apprehension generated by racist dema-
 goguery and demonstration should not support a prison term under
 free speech principles, so the general apprehension produced by bias
 crimes should not support an additional prison term.38
 35. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (striking down a law that criminalized
 advocating violence to effect political reform); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978),
 cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (invalidating an ordinance that would have denied a parade
 permit to a neo-Nazi group).
 36. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE ? 211.1(1)(c) (1962); ALA. CODE ? 13A-6-23 (1994);
 KY. REV. STAT. ? 508.050 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE ? 12.1-17-05 (1999); OR. REV. STAT. ?
 163.190 (1997).
 37. The "clear and present danger" test can be seen in a chronology of Supreme Court
 cases forming and incorporating the test. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (per cu-
 riam) (reversing a conviction for a statement generally advocating lawlessness at an indefi-
 nite future time); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (per curiam) (stating
 that advocacy, to be criminalized, must be "directed to inciting or producing imminent law-
 less action. .."); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
 (requiring "clear and imminent danger of some substantive evil" for criminalization);
 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (introducing the "clear and present danger"
 test). While the clear and present danger test has not always been applied vigorously by the
 Supreme Court, see Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52, strong arguments can be made for the test's
 theoretical soundness. See Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First
 Amendment: In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1159 (1982).
 38. Lawrence's fear-based criterion for bias crimes is also too narrow. Lawrence writes,
 "racially targeted behavior that vents the actor's racism is racial speech that is protected by
 the First Amendment, even if it disturbs the observer greatly." P. 102. A racially targeted
 assault may be behavior that vents the actor's racism, but it is not protected speech even in
 the absence of the intent or effect to create fear in the addressee. The First Amendment
 protects neither conduct nor speech, e.g., a bomb threat, that causes substantial direct harm.
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 Finally, Lawrence's theory leaves bias-crime laws open to the criti-
 cism of being improperly content based. Even if bias crimes could be
 subjected to significant penalties based on the fact that they, in causing
 fear of injury, are analogous to fighting words, the question remains
 whether bias crimes can be so singled out for enhanced penalization.
 In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Supreme Court struck down a local
 ordinance that prohibited cross burning and like acts that were likely
 to cause alarm in others "on the basis of race, color creed, religion or
 gender."39 The Court reasoned that although the ordinance banned
 only fighting words, it violated the First Amendment because the ban
 was limited to an improper content-defined subcategory of fighting
 words (essentially bias-motivated fighting words).40 As Lawrence rec-
 ognizes, bias-crime laws might be open to similar challenges that they
 are not appropriately content neutral (p. 105). In Mitchell, the Court
 rejected such a challenge, in part, on the ground that bias-crime laws
 regulated conduct and not speech and so were not content based.41
 Lawrence, however, rejects as superficial the speech/conduct dis-
 tinction. He believes that bias crimes have an expressive aspect and,
 as such, should be afforded the protection available to speech (pp. 89-
 92). Lawrence thus accepts that the First Amendment's presumption
 against content-based restrictions applies to bias-crime laws. Accord-
 ing to Lawrence, the proper inquiry is whether the state can "advance
 a nonpretextual justification for the distinction drawn in its criminal
 law, a justification that stands independent of any effort to suppress
 the expression of ideas" (p. 104). Similarly, Lawrence writes, "[w]e
 must ask whether bias crime statutes further an important interest un-
 related to the suppression of racist speech" (p. 106). Lawrence identi-
 fies three such interests: the need to deter a rapidly increasing form of
 crime, the need to specifically deter a perpetrator with a high degree
 of potential dangerousness, and the desire to address a crime that has
 a particularly injurious effect on the victim, the targeted group, and
 society at large (p. 106). Thus, based on considerations not very dif-
 ferent from those identified in Mitchell,42 Lawrence concludes that
 bias-crime laws do not employ a constitutionally defective content-
 based distinction.
 39. 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992).
 40. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 391-94.
 41. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993).
 42. 508 U.S. at 487-88. The Court stated that:
 [T]he Wisconsin statute singles out for enhancement bias-inspired conduct because this con-
 duct is thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm. For example, according to the
 State and its amici, bias-motivated crimes are more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, in-
 flict distinct emotional harms on their victims, and incite community unrest.
 Id.
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 Lawrence's defense of bias-crime laws is not satisfactory. As a
 general matter, in order to defend bias-crime laws against the claim
 that they are improperly content based, it is insufficient to show they
 further an important state interest unrelated to the suppression of
 speech. Such a showing entirely misses the point of the requirement
 of content neutrality. Preserving the peace and tranquility of a resi-
 dential neighborhood is an important state interest unrelated to the
 suppression of speech.43 An ordinance banning sound trucks that an-
 nounce the communist manifesto from residential neighborhoods ad-
 vances that interest. Nevertheless, the ordinance clearly would be an
 unconstitutional content-based restriction. Because the interest ad-
 vanced does not explain why the ordinance is limited to a certain class
 of peace-disrupting conduct, the interest appears pretextual.
 More specifically, the three harm-based justifications advanced by
 Lawrence have a disturbing air of pretext about them. Consider the
 alleged need to deter a rapidly increasing form of crime. As Lawrence
 recognizes, there is little solid evidence that the rate of bias crimes is
 increasing rapidly. Lawrence writes, "it remains difficult... to gauge
 whether the bias crime problem has actually worsened or merely ap-
 pears to have done so [due to heightened awareness of the problem]"
 (p. 20). The issue is fogged by "incomplete data" (p. 24). The best ar-
 gument for an increase in bias crimes, Lawrence believes, is the his-
 torical parallel between bias-crime rates and conditions of economic
 unrest (pp. 25-26). Characterizing the state of the current economy as
 "adverse" (p. 26), Lawrence infers a relatively high rate of bias crimes
 today. The general fall of the crime rate over the last few years,44
 however, belies the supposition that current economic conditions are
 fertile ground for antisocial sentiment and behavior. Furthermore,
 even assuming that the rising rate of bias crimes could be satisfactorily
 established, there remains a serious problem with relying on this fact
 as a nonpretextual justification. According to the Federal Bureau of
 Investigation's data for the period of 1985 to 1994, the rates of murder,
 rape, robbery, aggravated assault, larceny, and car theft increased.45
 Nevertheless, during that period, there was no across-the-board in-
 43. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) ("The State's interest in protecting the
 well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and
 civilized society."); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) (implying that reasonable
 time, manner, and place restrictions are permissible to regulate loudspeakers).
 44. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE SOURCEBOOK
 OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1998, at 173 tbl.3.2 (1999) (describing the approxi-
 mately 22% and 25% drop in rates of personal and property crimes (respectively) from 1995
 to 1998).
 45. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
 OF THE UNITED STATES: 1997, at 201 tbl.313 (117th ed. 1997).
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 crease in penalties. To single out bias crimes as being particularly in
 need of increased penalties based on rising rates seems pretextual.46
 Equally questionable is Lawrence's reliance on the need to specifi-
 cally deter perpetrators with a high degree of potential dangerousness.
 Lawrence cites a study that found that assaults based on bias are more
 than twice as likely to result in physical injury as other assaults (p. 39).
 To the extent that bias crimes are, on average, more dangerous than
 their counterpart crimes without bias, it would seem that specific de-
 terrence could be achieved more directly through increased punish-
 ment of crimes actually involving physical injuries. Furthermore, an
 individual's potential dangerousness is a function of both the
 dangerousness of the crime and of the likelihood of an individual's
 committing a crime. Lawrence presents neither direct nor circumstan-
 tial evidence that bias criminals have an especially high rate of recidi-
 vism. While a term in prison is unlikely to negate the many factors
 that lead a person to commit a bias crime, the rehabilitative effects of
 prison are undoubtedly weak for many classes of offenders. Those
 who commit crimes motivated by the need to support a drug habit, the
 dislike of authority, religious conviction, uncontrollable anger, or
 deep-seated alienation are likely in need of specific deterrence.
 There remains the claim that "the desire to address a crime that
 has a particularly injurious effect on the victim, the targeted group,
 and the society at large" (p. 106) constitutes a nonpretextual reason
 for bias-crime laws. These particularly injurious effects are undoubt-
 edly central to the case for bias-crime laws. Let me, however, suggest
 three reasons to doubt that their invocation is anything more than a
 convenient pretext.
 First, racism and other varieties of bigotry are disfavored ideolo-
 gies in our society. In some individuals, these forms of bias exist as no
 more than unarticulated or barely conscious prompting. A man who
 chooses his seat on the bus to avoid sitting next to a person of a differ-
 ent color need not subscribe to a racist "ideology." Those who are
 subject to prosecution under bias-crime laws, however, are often ex-
 tremists who ascribe to coherent, if baseless, theories of racism, intol-
 erance, and bigotry. Lawrence himself characterizes these forms of
 bias as an ideology, and indeed, makes their status as an ideology an
 essential element in the justification of their prohibition (pp. 11-12).
 Bias-crime laws today are thus analogous to a hypothetical Cold War
 46. Furthermore, while the end of stemming the rising rate of bias crimes may be a con-
 stitutionally legitimate one, it cannot justify, from a deontological perspective, more severe
 punishment. From a deontological perspective, the perpetrator's personal desert, not her
 membership in a contingently expanding class of like perpetrators, must dictate the punish-
 ment. Lawrence does not set for himself the goal of developing a unified justification of
 bias-crime laws consistent with both deontological constraints and the Constitution. Such a
 justification, however, would be more intellectually satisfying than the diverse moral and
 constitutional justifications Lawrence presents.
 1693 May 2000]
This content downloaded from 141.217.98.21 on Thu, 13 Sep 2018 22:12:39 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Michigan Law Review
 era law providing enhanced penalties for crimes "motivated by
 Marxism." Such a hypothetical law might be defended based on the
 particularly great injuries that Marxist-motivated crimes arguably tend
 to produce (economic instability, pervasive suspicion and fear, reac-
 tionary responses, etc.). In light of its facial targeting of an unpopular
 ideology, any such defense should be greeted with some degree of
 skepticism, if not heightened scrutiny. The same skepticism is appro-
 priate for the rationales Lawrence advances in support of bias crimes.
 Second, these harm-based rationales are not the ones that actually
 explain the enactment of bias-crime laws. The "desire to address a
 crime that has a particularly injurious effect" (p. 106) suggests a con-
 sequential desire to do something about a particularly virulent social
 problem. According to Lawrence, however, "[t]he rhetoric surround-
 ing the enactment of bias-crime laws suggests that most supporters of
 such legislation espouse a thoroughly deontological justification"
 based on the bias criminal's greater culpability for violating "the
 equality principle" (p. 61). This deontological justification undercuts
 the harm-based justifications Lawrence advances.
 Finally, Lawrence himself seems to be motivated by concerns other
 than the harms to the victim, her group, and society that bias crimes
 allegedly cause. The most telling evidence that these concerns are
 pretextual is perhaps the very language of Lawrence's model bias-
 crime law. Lawrence's model statute establishes three means of com-
 mitting a bias crime. Under the model statute, a person is guilty of a
 first-degree bias crime if he commits any crime "with the knowledge
 that... his conduct will be perceived... [as] motivated... by ill
 will... due to the ... race, color [or] religion ... of the victim" (p. 170;
 emphasis added). A person is guilty of a second-degree bias crime if
 he commits any crime "with conscious disregard for the substantial and
 unjustifiable risk that his conduct will be perceived... [as] moti-
 vated... by ill will... due to the... race, color [or] religion... of
 the victim" (p. 171; emphasis added). Given the Model Penal Code's
 well-known purpose-knowledge-recklessness-negligence culpability
 scheme, one naturally would expect that the third way of committing a
 bias crime would be acting with the purpose that such action would be
 perceived as based on bias.47 Such a provision would be consistent
 with the harm-based justification of bias-crime laws, which looks to
 the impact of the perception of bias. In fact, the third way to commit a
 bias crime under Lawrence's statute is to commit any crime "moti-
 vated ... by ill will... due to the ... race, color, [or] religion ... of the
 victim" (p. 170).
 By including a provision that focuses on the motivation itself, as
 opposed to consistently addressing the perception of the actor's con-
 47. Lawrence believes that permitting liability based on mere negligence improperly
 would minimize the gravity of bias crimes. P. 73.
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 duct, Lawrence's model law is underinclusive with respect to the
 harms that allegedly ground it. Lawrence's model law fails to cover
 those who act with the purpose of causing the mistaken perception of
 a biased crime. For example, outside the scope of Lawrence's model
 statute would be the Protective Property Owner and the Misleading
 Arsonist. The Protective Property Owner is a racially tolerant person
 who is afraid that if minorities come to live in his neighborhood, the
 property value of his house will diminish significantly, and thus, for
 purely economic reasons, he, out of desperation, dents the fender of
 his minority neighbor's car hoping that his neighbor will interpret this
 as racially biased and leave the neighborhood, but lacking the belief
 that there is a substantial likelihood that his act will be so interpreted.
 The Misleading Arsonist is an arsonist who, before destroying a com-
 petitor's store, paints a swastika on the property on the off-chance the
 arson will be attributed to a hate group and the ensuing investigation
 will be directed away from him. Though the Protective Property
 Owner and the Misleading Arsonist intend to cause the relevant
 harms, they slip through the model statute.
 Likewise, by shifting from a focus on perception to motivation,
 Lawrence's model law is overinclusive with respect to the harms that
 allegedly ground it. Lawrence specifically considers the case of a per-
 son who conceals his bias motivation from the victim and her commu-
 nity so that "no one might even suspect that it was a bias crime" (p.
 67). Thus, he assumes that "the actor ... has not caused the objective
 harms associated with bias crimes" (p. 67). Lawrence labels such a
 person "The Clever Bias Criminal" (p. 65). If the harm-based justifi-
 cations advanced by Lawrence were actually at work, one would ex-
 pect the Clever Bias Criminal not to be subject to any additional pun-
 ishment based on his underlying motives. Not only has he caused no
 additional harm, but because he has no reason to believe that his se-
 cretly bias-motivated crime will result in additional harm, the Clever
 Bias Criminal is no more blameworthy than a person who merely
 commits a parallel crime. Yet Lawrence's model bias-crime law, by
 permitting liability to be triggered by bias motivation alone, explicitly
 is formulated to reach the Clever Bias Criminal.48
 In general, Lawrence displays admirable sensitivity to the subtle-
 ties and reach of the language of bias-crime laws. Lawrence clearly
 recognizes that there is a logical gap between his harm-based justifica-
 tions of bias-crime laws and his motivation-based formulations of bias-
 crime laws (p. 64). Lawrence, however, does not even consider trying
 to minimize that gap through statutes that directly address the harms
 48. P. 170. Inexplicably, Lawrence states that the Clever Bias Criminal is guilty of an
 attempted bias crime. P. 67. Under all actual bias-crime laws, as well as Lawrence's model
 law, he would be liable for committing a bias crime, assuming that he completed an
 underlying crime.
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 associated with bias crimes. For example, statutes might create en-
 hanced penalties where:
 1. The offender acted with the specific intent to create (or with knowl-
 edge that he was likely to create) terror within a definable community.
 2. The offender acted with specific intent to create (or with knowledge
 that he was likely to create) a threat of further crime.
 3. The offender knew or should have known that a victim was particu-
 larly susceptible to the criminal conduct.
 4. The offender, in the commission of the offense, intended to inflict se-
 rious emotional distress.
 5. The commission of the offense created serious psychological harm
 (comparable to 'serious physical harm' specifications that enhance penal-
 ties).
 6. The offender acted with specific intent to interfere with another's ex-
 ercise of constitutional or statutory rights, or another's enjoyment of or
 access to public facilities, or another's enjoyment of equal opportunity.49
 Nor does Lawrence even consider a statute that consistently focuses
 on only conduct creating the perception of bias motivation. Such a
 statute would seem to be more consistent with the harm-based justifi-
 cations Lawrence advances. These facts appear to undercut the sin-
 cerity of Lawrence's proffered rationales.
 What does Lawrence really have in mind when he speaks of "the
 desire to address a crime that has a particularly injurious effect" (p.
 106)? Surprisingly nowhere in his book does he directly advance the
 claim that bias-crime laws will reduce the number of bias crimes or the
 harms associated with them. Such a claim would require complicated
 empirical argument concerning the causes and effects of bias crime
 that outstrips the current data.50 By "address" Lawrence means some-
 thing other than "prevent." Only in the final chapter of the book, en-
 titled "Why Punish Hate," far away from his First Amendment discus-
 sion, does Lawrence reveal his true grounds for believing bias-crime
 laws are desirable (as opposed to merely permissible (p. 161)). In-
 voking an expressive theory of punishment, Lawrence writes that
 "[t]he punishment of bias crimes is necessary for the full expression of
 commitment to the American values of equality of treatment and op-
 portunity" (p. 169). Lawrence appears to believe that such expression
 has both a noninstrumental symbolic value and also some consequen-
 tialist aspect for law-abiding citizens (pp. 166-67), but his discussion in
 this regard is lofty and abstract. Unfortunately, Lawrence does not
 49. Susan Gellman, Hate Crime Laws Are Thought Crime Laws, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV.
 AM. L. 509, 511 (proposing penalty enhancement for those situations) (footnotes omitted).
 50. The success of bias-crime laws in deterring bias crimes is unknown. See Staff, supra
 note 2, at 64 (finding that the impact of bias-crime laws on bias crime is "relatively inconclu-
 sive" and conclusions are "difficult to draw").
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 address whether expressing opposition to an ideology is a legitimate
 motive for enhancing criminal sanctions for conduct based on the ide-
 ology. Could Marxist-motivated crime (or speech) be punished more
 severely simply because our society wants to express its objection to
 Marxism? Surely not. Relying on an expressive theory of punishment
 to justify content-based punishment seems far too easy a path to
 content-based criminal laws. Lawrence writes that "[e]xpressive the-
 ory may be concerned less with providing a full justification of pun-
 ishment than with understanding the full impact of the punishment"
 (p. 167). But if the expressive theory is the key to understanding why
 a state "should" (p. 161) have bias-crime laws, and non-pretextual rea-
 sons determine constitutionality, its validity deserves closer scrutiny.
 B. Bias-Crime Laws and Motives
 At the end of Chapter Five, Lawrence considers an additional First
 Amendment argument raised against bias-crime statutes: the argu-
 ment that bias-crime laws violate the First Amendment because they
 criminalize motives (pp. 106-09). Lawrence rejects the argument in
 part because he considers the distinction between motives (which al-
 legedly should not bear on liability) and intent (which obviously may)
 to be only a "formal" distinction bearing no substantive weight. Spe-
 cifically, Lawrence believes that motives are definitionally just inten-
 tions that have not been established by the positive law as bearing on
 liability. Insofar as bias-crime laws establish that bias is relevant to li-
 ability, bias becomes an intention and is indistinguishable from other
 intentions the law may properly criminalize. Lawrence writes,
 "[w]hether bias-crime laws punish motivation or intent is not inherent
 in those prohibitions. Rather, the distinction simply mirrors the way
 in which we choose to describe them" (p. 109). Thus, Lawrence con-
 cludes, the motive-based argument against bias crimes cannot get off
 the ground.
 While I do not subscribe to the proposition that the First
 Amendment contains an absolute prohibition against the criminaliza-
 tion of motives, I believe there is more to the intent/motive distinction
 than Lawrence recognizes. Lawrence is correct that many uncontro-
 versial criminal law doctrines could be characterized as criminalizing
 motives. Burglary could be reformulated as trespassing with the mo-
 tive to commit a felony on the unlawfully entered premises; the de-
 fense of necessity (or putative necessity) could be reformulated as
 committing a crime with the motive to avoid a greater evil; attempted
 homicide could be reformulated as acting with the motive of causing
 death. The much-repeated maxim against punishing motives, how-
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 ever, is not dismissed so easily. There is a core of truth to it.51 As il-
 lustrated above, the motivations relevant to criminal law share a
 common quality: they directly reflect the perpetrator's intent to
 achieve a significant social harm or good beyond that associated with
 the prohibited conduct. In H.L.A. Hart's terminology, they are "fur-
 ther intention[s]."52 In contrast, the criminal law has virtually never
 found relevant to liability motives that directly reflect only a further
 intent to achieve a socially insignificant end, such as the demonstration
 of manhood, the satisfaction of a material desire, the elimination of a
 romantic rival, the obtaining of funds to pay a personal debt, and so
 on.53 The irrelevance of such intentions to liability is the maxim's core
 of truth. Thus, contra Lawrence, the maxim embodies more than a
 "formal" requirement - it reflects a substantive distinction between
 mental states that would make the actor accountable for significant
 social harms or benefits and those that would not.54 Bias falls in the
 latter category. To act from bias is not logically equivalent to acting
 with the further intent to humiliate the victim, to spread fear through
 the victim's community, to provoke a race war,55 or to achieve any
 other result, much less achieve a significant further social harm. Be-
 cause bias-crime laws cannot be reformulated as prohibiting criminal
 conduct with the intent of achieving any further socially significant
 harm, they are contrary to the core truth of the general rule that
 criminal law does not punish motives.56 Thus, even if the criminaliza-
 tion of motive is not per se offensive to the First Amendment, the ar-
 gument may not be dismissed as easily as Lawrence suggests.57
 51. As George Fletcher has written:
 At one level, the claim that motives do not typically bear on criminal liability is a technical
 point about the way offenses are usually defined. But there is also a deeper point suggested
 by the claim that the actor's ultimate purposes do not bear on his or her culpability for
 criminal conduct.
 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 452 (1979).
 52. H.L.A. Hart, Intention and Punishment, 4 OXFORD REV. (1967), reprinted in H.L.A.
 HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, 117-18
 (1968).
 53. A narrow exception is MODEL PENAL CODE ? 213.5 (1962), which provides that "[a]
 person commits a misdemeanor if, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of
 himself or of any person other than his spouse, he exposes his genitals under circumstances in
 which he knows his conduct is likely to cause affront or alarm.") (emphasis added). The
 provision would seem more just and effective if the italicized language concerning motiva-
 tion were removed.
 54. See supra text accompanying notes 9-15.
 55. Cf Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 949-51 (1983) (holding that a desire to start a
 race war may be relevant to several statutory aggravating factors).
 56. Cf Douglas N. Husak, Motive and Criminal Liability, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS,
 WINTER/SPRING 1989, at 3; Paul H. Robins, Hate Crimes: Crimes of Motive, Character, or
 Group Terror? 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 605, 606-09.
 57. In a recent article, Carol S. Steiker argues that criminalizing bias is consistent with
 the criminal law's general treatment of motive. See Carol S. Steiker, Punishing Hateful Mo-
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 In sum, Lawrence's First Amendment defense succeeds in going a
 long way on very little. Abjuring the problematic distinctions between
 conduct and speech and between motive and ideology, Lawrence rests
 his case on a variety of relatively value-neutral, harm-based policy
 ends, such as protecting victims, their community, and society at large
 from injuries analogous to those caused by verbal assaults and men-
 acing. Such an approach, if legally sound, still invites suspicion. Its
 empirical foundation in rising bias-crime rates, future dangerousness
 of bias criminals, and deterability of bias crimes is weak; its air of be-
 ing motivated by hostility to a disfavored ideology is strong. Never-
 theless, to anyone dissatisfied with the Supreme Court's treatment of
 the issue in Mitchell, Lawrence's account offers an alternative ap-
 proach with appeal and potential.
 III. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN PROSECUTING
 BIAS CRIMES
 The final major topic that Lawrence considers is the federal gov-
 ernment's role in prosecuting bias crimes. Because there are currently
 no federal laws prohibiting bias crimes per se, a compelling argument
 for the expansion of the federal government into this area would be a
 significant contribution to an open policy issue. In this regard,
 Punishing Hate presents a generally persuasive, if not fully developed,
 case that the federal government should enact bias-crime laws and
 play some role in their enforcement.58
 Lawrence organizes his discussion of the federal prosecution of
 bias crimes around three questions: the constitutional, the prudential
 tives: Old Wine in a New Bottle Revives Calls for Prohibition, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1857 (1999)
 (book review). She argues that all or many determinations of the criminal law to make mo-
 tive relevant are "political to the core" in just the way the bias-crime laws allegedly are. Id.
 at 1866 (citations omitted). She offers the example of the manslaughter provocation doc-
 trine according to which consuming passion caused by the discovery of infidelity is partially
 exculpatory. See id. at 1863. In contrast, Streiker notes, consuming passion caused by the
 discovery of one's daughter in bed with a man of another race will not be exculpatory. See
 id. at 1865. If this distinction between motives is not thought objectionable, why should the
 enhancement of a penalty due to bias be objectionable? The answer is that the manslaugh-
 ter example involves the intention to kill and the further intention to revenge an act of adul-
 tery. This further intention is one that is considered socially valid, or at least "understand-
 able." This assessment of the further intention undeniably involves a value judgment: the
 judgment that one's status as an adulterer is, at least arguably, morally relevant. In contrast,
 the status of being Asian-American, for example, is not morally relevant. Thus, to act based
 on bias is worse than to act based on the discovery of infidelity, which may mitigate culpa-
 bility. But it is not worse than other "generic" motivations, like envy, which involve no so-
 cially acceptable further intentions.
 58. The issue of whether the federal government should enact and enforce bias-crime
 laws is, of course, logically independent from the question, addressed in Part I, whether such
 laws are justified. The latter question concerned the appropriate penalty level for bias
 crimes. Assuming it were appropriate for the federal government to enact bias-crime laws,
 those laws could impose penalties that were either equal to or greater than the penalties for
 parallel crimes in the same jurisdiction.
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 and the pragmatic. With respect to the first question - Congress's
 constitutional authority to enact bias-crime laws - Lawrence's discus-
 sion would benefit from greater depth. Lawrence concedes that the
 Commerce Clause is "a poor[] fit" (p. 152) and the Fourteenth and
 Fifteenth Amendments are inadequate bases for a federal bias-crime
 law because of the state-action requirement (p. 153). This leaves the
 Thirteenth Amendment as the remaining potential source for the
 authority to regulate bias crimes. The Thirteenth Amendment, by its
 terms, expressly prohibits only slavery and involuntary servitude; bias
 crimes are neither. The Amendment's Enabling Clause, however, has
 been interpreted broadly to permit legislation to eradicate so-called
 "badges and incidents" of slavery.59 Following such broad interpreta-
 tion, racially motivated violence against African Americans could be
 deemed a badge or incidence of slavery because the hostility produc-
 ing such violence can be traced to the fact that African Americans
 were once the subjects of slavery in this country. Bias crimes against
 African Americans, however, have composed only about forty percent
 of reported bias crimes.60
 Lawrence's Thirteenth Amendment arguments for the constitu-
 tionality of bias-crime laws that reach beyond the protection of
 African Americans are comparatively weak. Lawrence notes that in
 the Slaughter-House Cases, the Supreme Court suggested that the
 Thirteenth Amendment would prohibit "Mexican peonage" and
 "Chinese coolie labor systems."61 The Thirteenth Amendment un-
 doubtedly covers the actual slavery of all people both de jure and de
 facto, and, perhaps, analogous institutions such as the forced prostitu-
 tion of illegal immigrants, as well as the badges and incidents thereof.
 It seems a stretch, however, to claim it covers discrete bias-motivated
 acts of violence against groups that have no history of subjugation in
 the United States. Lawrence asserts that modern cases have extended
 the Thirteen Amendment's protections to religious groups (p. 154).
 The cases he cites in support of this proposition,62 however, only ad-
 dressed the scope of 42 U.S.C. ?? 1981 and 1982. The Court made no
 reference to their roots in the Thirteenth Amendment. Furthermore,
 in those cases, the Court stated that discrimination based solely on re-
 59. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968); The Civil Rights Cases, 109
 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
 60. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
 OF THE UNITED STATES: 1998, at 215 tbl.344 (118th ed. 1998).
 61. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 72 (1873) (noting that such systems would have
 to develop into slavery of those races).
 62. See Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604 (1987) (holding that a person
 of Arabian ancestry may be protected from racial discrimination under ? 1981); Shaare
 Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U.S. 615 (1987) (holding that because Jews were consid-
 ered a distinct race they may assert claims under ? 1982).
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 ligion or place of origin was not within the scope of section 1981.63
 These cases are slender reeds to support his position.
 In the end, Lawrence's call for this expansion of the Thirteenth
 Amendment seems to rest on the following passage:
 The broad reach of the Thirteenth Amendment as understood today
 goes beyond a prohibition of re-enslavement of those who have previ-
 ously been enslaved. By protecting ethnic, religious, and national-origin
 minority groups, the Thirteenth Amendment is now more consonant
 with a positive guarantee of freedom and equal participation in civil soci-
 ety. Violence, directed against an individual out of motive of group bias,
 violates this concept ...." [p. 154; footnote omitted]
 This argument, in my view, is too facile and abstract, resting more on
 wishful thinking and an assumed shared understanding of "a positive
 guarantee of freedom and equal participation," than on solid legal
 authority and analysis. Lawrence devotes thirty-six pages to reviewing
 this country's convoluted history of federal civil rights enforcement
 (pp. 113-49). Given this introduction, one would expect greater atten-
 tion to the substantive constitutional question at issue. While there is
 room to argue that the Thirteenth Amendment might support broad
 bias-crime legislation,64 Lawrence does not make that argument con-
 vincingly.
 Lawrence's discussion of the prudential and pragmatic questions
 relating to the federal bias crime prosecution is more persuasive, even
 if its practical significance is less than clear. Lawrence argues that
 there is a strong federal interest in supplementing states' historically
 lax prosecution of bias crimes, because racial equality is an important
 component of the "national social contract" (pp. 155-57). Lawrence
 advocates neither a massive federal "war" against bias crimes nor a
 barrage of dual state-federal prosecutions. Rather, he envisions a pro-
 cess in which "federal and state law enforcement work together, par-
 ticularly at the investigatory stage, and then, when it comes time to de-
 termine which criminal charges are to be brought, the merits of each
 are weighed" (p. 160). Such a relationship, Lawrence believes, might
 resemble that between federal and state authorities in the area of po-
 lice brutality prosecutions (p. 158). Would such a relationship work in
 practice? Lawrence thinks that local-federal turf battles are avoidable
 (p. 160). He, however, does not address the issues of whether dual ju-
 risdiction over bias crimes might result in buck passing between local
 63. See, e.g., Saint Francis College, 481 U.S. at 613 ("If respondent on remand can prove
 that he was subjected to intentional discrimination based on the fact that he was born an
 Arab, rather than solely on the place or nation of his origin, or his religion, he will have
 made out a case under ? 1981.").
 64. See, e.g., Peter Brandon Bayer, Rationality- and The Irrational Underinclusiveness
 of the Civil Rights Laws, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 67 n.214 (1988); G. Sidney Buchanan,
 The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth Amendment, 12 HOUS. L. REV. 1,
 7-15 (1974).
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 and federal authorities or unduly complicate investigations. Nor does
 he consider whether it is a sound expenditure of limited federal re-
 sources to prosecute the typical bias crime involving minor property
 damage or personal injury. Likely, Lawrence would rely on the
 Justice Department to intelligently assess these matters before in-
 volving itself. It is difficult to object to the grant of power where the
 use of that power will be guided by intelligent discretion. Still, one
 wonders whether Lawrence's call for the federal prosecution of bias
 crimes is a proposal for a significant policy change with large-scale re-
 percussions or merely for a symbolic expansion of federal authority
 with a negligible impact. Just as it is difficult to assess the validity of
 bias-crime laws without knowing the amount of the proposed penalty
 enhancements, it is difficult to assess the practicality of federal bias-
 crime enforcement without knowing the amount of the proposed ac-
 tivity.
 CONCLUSION
 Punishing Hate presents a well-organized and coherent defense of
 bias-crime laws. Nevertheless, it at points appears to reflect an unre-
 solved tension in the thinking of the defenders of bias-crime laws.
 This tension is best exemplified by Lawrence's model bias-crime law.
 This law authorizes additional punishment based on the existence of
 bias, as well as the appearance, or perception, thereof. The latter con-
 dition ties into the harm-based rationales for bias-crime laws that in-
 form most of Lawrence's defense of bias-crime laws. The appearance
 of bias is the more proximate cause of the harms associated with bias
 crimes since these harms follow from actual bias only insofar as the
 bias is perceived. It is, however, the former condition - the triggering
 of punishment by bias itself - that most raises the hackles of those
 who oppose bias-crime laws. The most likely explanation for going
 further and criminalizing motive is that only such a provision would
 make a statement directly against bias. It is doubtful that a hypotheti-
 cal bill targeting "the appearance of a bias-motivated crime" would
 garner significant legislative support. Rather, one suspects, only inso-
 far as bias-crime bills can be understood as striking at racism, intoler-
 ance, and bigotry, will they be elevated to law. Indeed, Lawrence's
 desire to be seen as striking at racism, intolerance, and bigotry itself
 may explain Lawrence's repeated statements that bias crimes are nec-
 essarily matters of motive65 - a claim plainly inconsistent with
 Lawrence's model statute, which permits liability based on merely the
 perception of motive irrespective of actual motive.
 65. Lawrence begins his book by defining a bias crime as "a crime committed as an act
 of prejudice," p. 9, and later reasserts, after lengthy analysis, that "precisely what we are
 punishing" with bias-crime laws is "conduct grounded in racial animus." P. 79.
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 One senses in Punishing Hate a mild form of schizophrenia. On
 the one hand, Lawrence frequently adheres to a safe liberal/libertarian
 defense of bias-crime laws that turns on the harms that are produced
 contingently when bias-motivated acts are perceived as such. In this
 light, bias-crime laws are little more controversial than laws prohibit-
 ing menacing, verbal assault, or other plainly unprotected expression.
 On the other hand, Lawrence sometimes presents a more politically
 correct, but philosophically problematic position that bias motivation,
 and the objectionable values that inform it, are the evils that must be
 driven from our society. This sentiment arises both in the context of
 Lawrence's deontological justification of bias-crime laws as well as in
 the final chapter of Punishing Hate where Lawrence advances his ex-
 pressive account of bias-crime laws untethered to the claim that they
 will reduce the number of bias crimes.
 Perhaps my diagnosis is too strong. Perhaps it is legitimate to
 point to the harms contingently associated with bias crimes when re-
 sponding to fastidious punishment theorists or zealous First
 Amendment advocates and to point to symbolic importance of equal-
 ity when addressing an audience prone to reading appealing values
 into bias-crime laws. But an expressive account of bias-crime laws
 adds little to the debate. If bias-crime laws are not supported ade-
 quately by harm-based arguments, but trammel on First Amendment
 values, enacting them expresses a lack of respect for those First
 Amendment values. Conversely, if bias-crime laws are justified on
 harm-based grounds, then enacting them in an open society expresses
 the exact values underlying those grounds, such as the evil of humili-
 ating another, not the ideal of equality. Ultimately, the place of bias-
 crime laws in our society must turn on the validity of those harm-
 based defenses that Lawrence so well identifies, not the importance of
 equality as an abstract ideal that Lawrence so elegantly articulates.
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